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SECTION 113 OF THE PROPOSED COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION-A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO PROTECT
THE UTILITARIAN ASPECTS OF USEFUL ARTICLES*
"Useful articles" are articles which serve some functional or
utilitarian purpose. Cigarette lighters, pens, chairs and guns are
all useful articles and the list is unending. A proprietary interest
in a useful article can be protected by obtaining a patent, but
this process is costly and time-consuming because of the extensive
examination the article undergoes in the Patent Office to deter-
mine whether it is a patentable invention. This delay could be
avoided by using the copyright laws, but these statutes and the
decisions interpreting them only grant protection to the two dimen-
sional drawings or blueprints of the useful article. The three
dimensional form of the article is not protected. Although copy-
right protection is established immediately upon publication and
eliminates the delay, the inventor does not receive full protection.
Section 113 of the proposed Copyright Law Revision provides:
Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works
(a) Subject to the provisions of clauses (1) and (2) of this
subsection, the exclusive right to reproduce a copy-
righted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in copies
under section 1061 includes the right to reproduce the
work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or
otherwise.
(1) This title does not afford, to the owner of copy-
right in a work that portrays a useful article as
such, any greater rights with respect to the mak-
ing, distribution, or display of the useful article so
portrayed than those afforded to such copyrighted
works under the law in effect on December 31,
1968.
(2) In the case of a work lawfully reproduced in use-
* This article has been submitted to the Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition at Dickinson School of Law, 1968.
1. S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1967).
§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works
Subject to sections 107 through 116, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any
of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phono-
records;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending;
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ful articles that have been offered for sale or
other distribution to the public, copyright does not
include any right to prevent the making, distribu-
tion, or display of pictures or photographs of such
articles in connection with the advertisements or
commentaries relating to the distribution or dis-
play of such articles, or in connection with news
reports.
(b) A "useful article" is an article having an intrinsic util-
itarian function that is not merely to portray the ap-
pearance of the article or to convey information. An
article that is normally a part of a useful article is
a "useful article."
2
This section is essentially a codification of existing case law with
a few minor extensions. This Comment will analyze the copyright
protection granted pursuant to this revision and will also investi-
gate utility and design patent protection for useful articles. The
deficiencies of current patent and copyright protection will be
noted and an amendment to section 113 will be suggested to over-
come these deficiencies by providing a hybrid patent-copyright pro-
tection for useful articles.
For the purpose of this Comment, "useful articles" shall mean
"articles of manufacture," thereby excluding machines, composi-
tions of matter and processes. This would seem to comply with the
definition of useful article found in section 113(b). Further, orna-
mental designs of articles of manufacture4 will not be considered
useful articles. Thus, the utilitarian or functional aspect of the
useful article is the only consideration.
CURRENT STATUTORY PROTECTION-COPYRIGHT AND PATENT
The utilitarian or functional aspects of useful articles are cur-
rently protected by the Patent Act. To obtain a patent for a use-
ful article, an applicant must spend a minimum of $65 to file the
application5 and withstand the rigors of showing that the inven-
2. S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 113 (1967).
3. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
§ 101. Inventions patentable
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and use-
ful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.
4. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1952).
§ 171. Patents for designs
Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for
an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.
5. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1952).
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tion is novel,6 useful,7 and unobvious in view of the prior art.8
Because of the volume of applications in the Patent Office, the
time from filing to allowance of claims in the patent is approxi-
mately three years. After the application is allowed and the
issuance fee of $100 is paid,9 the patented article is protected
against infringements 0 and the patentee is given the exclusive
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the useful
article.1 1 The patentee can not only exclude those who deliberately
infringe the patent, but also those who have independently and in-
nocently invented or infringed the invention. 12 Therefore, the idea
of the invention is protected, not merely a particular expression of
that idea. Under this reasoning "equivalents" of the invention are
also considered an infringement. 13
6. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1952).
§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to
patent
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country,
or patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the
applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed pub-
lication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date
of the application for patent in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an ap-
plication for patent by another filed in the United States
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
7. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
8. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.
9. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1952).
10. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1952).
§ 271. Infringement of patent
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever with-
out authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention,
within the United States during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.
See also Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1952), which grants a civil remedy
for patent infringement.
11. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
§ 154. Contents and term of patent
Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention
throughout the United States. ...
12. Section 271 of Title 35 makes no distinction between those who
have deliberately infringed and those who have innocently infringed.
13. The doctrine of equivalents states that there will be infringement
of the claims of an issued patent if another device, method or the like per-
Winter 1968]
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The patent laws also protect "new, original and ornamental
design [s] for an article of manufacture."' 4  This protection spe-
cifically excludes designs for articles of manufacture when the de-
sign fulfills some functional or utilitarian purpose. In Howe v.
Blodgett & Co.' 5 the scope of the protection afforded by the design
patent was defined:
Patents for designs are intended to apply to methods of
ornament, in which the utility depends upon the pleasing
effect imparted to the eye, and not upon any new function.
•... Design patents refer to appearance, not utility. Their
object is to encourage works of art and decoration which
appeal to the eye, to the esthetic emotions, to the beauti-
ful.'6
A design patent application undergoes the same examination as a
utility application with the resultant delay in issuance and protec-
tion. This delay from filing to issuance has motivated the intro-
duction of more than sixty bills into Congress' 7 in an effort to
obtain immediate protection for the ornamental designs of certain
articles of manufacture-specifically dresses.' None of these bills
have passed. The dress industry has long had a need to protect
dress designs immediately upon publication. Dress designs have
value for a limited duration, and patent design protection, be-
cause of the delay in obtaining the patent, is essentially a right
without a remedy since infringement proceedings cannot be
forms substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result. See Paul E. Hawkinson Co. v. Skegno-Gamble,
Inc., 20 F. Supp. 543 (D. Minn. 1937).
14. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1952).
15. 112 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1901).
16. Id. at 62.
17. See B. RINGER, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DESIGN PROTECTION 27-49 (1955);
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DEsIGN PROTECTION, 1959 SUPPLEMENT 44-71 (Strauss &
Ringer ed. 1959).
18. For a discussion of attempts to get legislation in the design copy-
right area see Blunt, Fighting the Design Pirate, 15 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 29
(1933); Callman, Style and Design Piracy, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 557 (1940);
Ehrlich, Copyright of Textile Design-Clarity and Confusion in the Second
Circuit, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1043 (1961); Hutchinson, Design Piracy, 18 HARv.
Bus. REV. 191 (1940); Jackson, Unfair Competition by Product Simulation
v. Copyright Protection for Designs, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 422 (1963); Lutz,
Can Ornamental Designs for Useful Articles be Protected by Copyright?-
Constitutional Basis of the Wilson Bill, 2 IDEA 289 (1958); Nikonow, Patent
Protection for New Designs of Dresses, 17 J. PAT. OFT. Soc'Y 253 (1935);
Solberg, The Present Cop'yright Situation, 40 YALE L.J. 184 (1931); Weikart,
Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 235 (1944); Note, The Vestal Bill for the Copy-
right Registration of Designs, 31 COL. L. Ruv. 477 (1931); Note, Protection
of the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72 HARv. L. Rxv. 1520 (1959);
Note, Protection of Styles and Designs in the Garment Industry, 26 U. CiNN.
L. REv. 86 (1957). The most recent design bill, S. 1237, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), is given an exhaustive treatment in Comment, Statutory Design




brought until issuance. 9 These bills have been efforts to obtain
copyright protection for a dress design by granting immediate pro-
tection without examination under the patent statute. Under this
proposed legislation the embodiment of the design and not the
idea would be protected, thereby preventing exact copying. When
the design is for a functional and not ornamental purpose, the bills
would not provide protection. A dress design is not currently
copyrightable because it is not a "work of art" within the meaning
of the existing copyright statute.20  Although pictures of the de-
sign can be copyrighted, their three dimensional embodiment is not
protected. 2' Copyright of functional articles will be discussed in
another section.
22
The current Copyright Act does not afford protection for
utilitarian three dimensional useful articles. The Copyright Of-
fice defines what is copyrightable as follows:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the
fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped will
not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a
a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic
sculpture, carving or pictorial representation, which can
be identified separately and are capable of existing inde-
pendently as a work of art, such features will be eligible
for registration.
2.
Although there is some overlap between copyright and design
patent protection,24 a clear demarcation exists between copyright
and utility patent protection. A patent protects an idea, but a
copyright protects only the expression of an idea. Thus, to ex-
press the same idea in a different form is not copyright infringe-
ment so long as there is not exact copying; rather, it is patent
infringement. 25  Copyright protection is established immediately
19. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1952). This section specifically states
that infringement can only occur "during the term of the patent."
20. See Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp.
187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934):
A dress is not copyrightable. A picture of a dress is; . . . To give
an author or designer an exclusive right to manufacture the art
described in the certificate of copyright registration, when no of-
ficial examination of its novelty has ever been made, would un-




22. See text accompanying notes 34-58 infra.
23. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1967).
24. For a discussion of the overlap of copyright and design patent
protection see Sharpe, Copyrights and Design Patents-The Common Zone
Between, 11 CLEV. MAR. L. REV. 336 (1962); Silverman, Scope of Protection
of Copyrights and Design Patents in the United States, 24 U. Prrr. L. REV.
21 (1962); Note, Design Patents and Copyrights: The Scope of Protection,
21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 (1953); Note, Design Patents and Copyrights:
The Present Inadequate State of the Law, 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 188 (1959).




upon publication with the proper notice.26 Patent protection does
not become effective until approval by the Patent Office.27 A
copyrightable work need only be original,2 but a patentable idea
must be novel, unobvious, new and useful.29 Copyright protection
can extend for fifty-six years.2 0 Utility patent protection lasts
for seventeen years after issuance 1 and design protection lasts for
three and one-half, seven, or fourteen years after issuance.
3 2
Section 5(i) of the current Copyright Act does, however, pro-
tect "[d] rawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical char-
acter. ' '33 The following section is directed to an analysis of this
provision.
CASE LAW INTERPRETING SECTION 5 (I)
The Copyright Office recognizes mechanical drawings, archi-
tect's blueprints and engineering diagrams as includable under
section 5(i). 34 Blueprints showing functional useful articles are
therefore copyrightable. As was noted, however, functional or
utilitarian useful articles in their three dimensional form are
not copyrightable. This dichotomy raises the question whether the
three dimensional embodiment of the two dimensional copyrighted
blueprint is protected by the two dimensional copyright. The an-
swer is negative for functional or utilitarian useful articles. Arti-
cles which can qualify as "works of art," however, are currently
protected in all mediums of expression. Section 113 of the pro-
posed Copyright Law Revision is a codification of this anomoly.
Subsection (a) gives the holder of a copyright in a "pictorial, gra-
phic, or sculptural work ... the right to reproduce the work in or
on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise."3 5  But
clause (1) of subsection (a) limits this right to reproduce in any
form through incorporation by reference of current case law,
which does not allow reproduction of useful articles in all mediums,
but only in drawings.3 6
There are two reasons for this limitation. First, the patent
statutes preempt the question of copyright protection for utilitar-
ian useful articles. To gain protection the useful articles must
26. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1947).
27. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
28. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1947); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1967).
29. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (1952).
30. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1947).
31. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
32. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1952).
33. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 5(i) (1947).
34. 37 C.F.R. § 202.12(a) (1967):
Works registrable in Class I include diagrams or models illustrat-
ing scientific or technical works or formulating scientific or tech-
nical information in linear or plastic form, such as, for example:
a mechanical drawing, an astronomical chart, an architect's blue-
print, an anatomical model, or an engineering diagram.
35. S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 113(a) (1967).
36. Id. § 113(a)(1).
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comply with the requirements for invention. If they do not, no
protection should be granted. Second, it is the expression of the
three dimensional useful article that is protected by the two
dimensional copyright and not the actual function of the useful
article. The relevant cases demonstrate the distinction.
The landmark decision in this area is Baker v. Selden. 7 In
this case a book which contained a series of lines for accounting
purposes was copyrighted. Suit was brought against a person ac-
cused of infringing the copyright by employing much the same sys-
tem of accounting. The Supreme Court held that the accounting
method was not copyrightable; that is, it was not the use of the
system of accounting that was copyrighted, but only the explana-
tion of that use. Following Baker came a series of analagous
cases in which the copyright holder had copyrighted a book that
explained a plan or method of doing business. The book was pro-
tected, but the method or plan in actual use was not. Thus, in
Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster 8 the plaintiff copyrighted a book
on how to learn the Russian language and the defendant pub-
lished a similar book. The court said: " [T]o the extent that [plain-
tiff] owns a new 'method' he owns nothing and when he accuses
defendants of having stolen his 'method' he accuses them of no
wrong."39 In Gaye v. Gillis40 the defendant was doing business
using coupon books similar to those used by the plaintiff, who had
copyrighted them. The court said: "A copyright does not cover an
idea or a system of doing business but only the particular mode of
expression of the idea embodied in the copyright material. '41
37. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
38. 144 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
39. Id. at 379.
40. 167 F. Supp. 416 (D. Mass. 1958).
41. Id. at 418. See also Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d
182 (7th Cir. 1944); Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872 (10th
Cir. 1938); Aldrich v. Remington Rand, 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Texas 1942).
In Caddy-Imbler Creations, Inc. v. Caddy, 299 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1962), the
court found that a copyrighted booklet describing a method for using
phonograph records was not infringed by a similar booklet describing the
same method. In Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), the plaintiff developed
a plan for the replacement of lost stock certificates. He copyrighted the
book describing the plan. Defendant used the plan and it was held that
no infringement existed. The court said:
There is also no question that Beardsley's arrangement of contents
in his proposal bond, however novel that arrangement may be, is
not copyrightable, for the novelty of the arrangement is the key
concept in the plan, and ideas and plans fall outside the copyright
laws.
Id. at 34. In Dunham v. General Mills, 116 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1953),
the plaintiff copyrighted masks with cut-out eyes. The defendant put cut-
out masks on its cereal boxes just as plaintiff had. Since the defendant
did not use the same masks, but only the idea of using cut-out masks,
there was no copyright infringement. Finally, in Loew's Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), the defendant did a
burlesque of the plaintiff's copyrighted dramatic play. This was held to
COMMENTS
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From Baker various extensions of this "explanation versus
use" doctrine developed. Copyrighted architectural blueprints
have been held not to protect the three dimensional building de-
picted in the blueprint.42 The blueprint is protected because it is
for the purpose of explanation; the building is not protected be-
cause it is for use. Drawings of parachutes,
43 dress designs, 4
bridges 45 and toys, 46 and photographs of furniture have been copy-
righted.4 7 In every instance, since the three dimensional embodi-
ments were primarily for use and not explanation, the actual arti-
cles were held not to infringe the two dimensional copyright.
The reason for these decisions is well stated in Jack Adelman,
Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc.: 4
8
To give an author or designer an exclusive right to manu-
facture the art described in the certificate of copyright reg-
istration, when no official examination of its novelty has
ever been made, would unjustly create a monopoly and
moreover would usurp the functions of letters patent.
49
On the other hand, drawings of tombstones" and cartoons5
have been copyrighted and their three dimensional embodiments
be infringement, however, since section 1 (d) of Title 35 allows holders of
a copyright in a dramatic work the right to perform the dramatic work in
any manner or method. For a discussion of this case see 31 N.Y.U. L. REv.
606 (1956); 28 RocKY MT. L. REv. 134 (1955).
42. DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla.
1962); see Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1967), where
the court suggests that Mazer v. Stein may limit the Baker doctrine and
alternatively that Baker, if literally read, may even allow copying of the
architectural blueprint to some extent since it is the demonstration of a
method for constructing a house. See generally H. BALL, THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 396 (1944); M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT 147-
51 (1967); 42 COL. L. REV. 290 (1942).
43. Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
44. Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187
(S.D.N.Y. 1934). See also National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Standard Mail
Order Co., 191 F. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
45. Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y.
1942).
46. Seip v. Commonwealth Plastics, 85 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1949).
47. See Kashins v. Lightmakers, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
where the plaintiff put a photograph of a lamp into a catalogue and the
defendant made the lamps from the photographs. The defendant then
made photographs of its own lamps and made a catalogue. Since the lamp
itself was not copyrightable, there was no infringement; Lamb v. Grand
Rapids School Furniture Co., 39 F. 474 (W.D. Mich. 1889), where the plain-
tiff published a book of engravings illustrating its furniture and the de-
fendant made the furniture. There was no copyright infringement.
48. 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
49. Id. at 189-90.
50. Jones Bros. v. Underkoffer, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936). For
a discussion of this case see 6 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 135 (1937).
51. King Features Synd. v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924); see
Fleischer Studios v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1935), where a picture of a "Betty Boop" car-
toon was infringed by a "Betty Boop" doll.
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were held to infringe the drawings. Likewise a photograph of a
copyrighted sculpture has been held an infringement.12 The ap-
parent reason for protecting tombstones and cartoons and not the
other named articles is that both the two dimensional expressions
and the three dimensional embodiments are for the purpose of ex-
planation; neither is for the purpose of use. A statutory basis
for the distinction also exists. Section 1(b) of the Copyright Act
allows the copyright holder to "complete, execute, and finish [the
work] if [the work] be a model or design for a work of art."53
Thus a "work of art" is protected in all mediums of expression.
The Copyright Office, not the courts, has assumed the burden of
defining works of art, and their definition does not include func-
tional useful articles. 54 Since a work of art is primarily for ex-
planation, any medium used for that explanation will also be a
work of art. Conversely, a work of art itself will not be for the
purpose of use. Given this reasoning, taken in conjunction with
the purpose of the patent statutes, it is not difficult to understand
why a stuffed toy of a cartoon character infringes the copyrighted
cartoon drawing. The benefit of the toy or its commercial value is
derived from the expression of the cartoon, which is a work of
art and protected in all mediums of expression.
This use-explanation distinction may appear to lose some clar-
ity, however, when for example a sculptured statuette is used as a
lamp base specifically for commercial purposes. Is the statuette
purely utilitarian because its use is to make a lamp? Is it a work
of art ab initio, and does it remain a work of art when it is put to a
purely utilitarian purpose? The Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein55
held that such a sculptured statuette was a work of art and there-
fore copyrightable under section 5(g).56 That the statuette was
mass produced as part of a lamp base did not make the statuette
utilitarian. This case does not really modify any prior decisions
because all that was protected by the copyright was the statuette
itself. The copyright does not prevent others from using dif-
ferent statuettes as lamp bases. It only prevents others from
copying the particular statuette. Thus the expression or explana-
52. Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 F. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1907); see Falk v. T.P.
Howell & Co., 202 F. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1888), where a photograph was in-
fringed when it was converted to a design for chair backs by a second user.
53. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(b) (1947) (emphasis added).
54. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1967).
(a) General. This class includes published or unpublished works
of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as ar-
tistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as
works belonging to the fine arts, such as painting, drawings
and sculpture.
55. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). For a discussion of this case see 4 CATHOLIC
U. L. REV. 130 (1954); 39 CORNELL L.Q. 725 (1954); 42 GEO. L.J. 548 (1954);
22 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 764 (1954).
56. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1947).
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tion was protected, but not the use. The Court also recognized
that the question of copyrightability was determined by the object
in question independently of how the object was later used. Sec-
tion 113(a) of the proposed Copyright Law Revision codifies the
Mazer case,5 7 but section 113 (a) (2)58 does restrict the application of
prior decisions. If pictures of the lamp were taken for any pur-
pose, this would be copyright infringement under previous deci-
sions. Section 113 (a) (2) would allow photographs of a copyrighted
work of art when that work is used for sale or distribution to the
public as part of a useful article and the photographs are used in
connection with advertisement, commentary relating to the distri-
bution or display of the article, or news reports.
The cases clearly indicate, however, that when a three dimen-
sional object is intrinsically utilitarian or functional, the copy-
right laws will not protect it. Any available protection is vested
in the utility patent laws.
ARE THE UTILITY PATENT LAWS ADEQUATE?
The purpose of the patent laws is to ensure public disclosure
of inventions so that all of society will benefit. In return the
inventor is given the exclusive right to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, or selling the invention for a limited period of time.
Without patents the incentive to invent would be substantially im-
paired; upon public disclosure, the inventor would lose all rights to
his invention and would therefore receive no reward for his con-
tribution.5 9 Absent patent protection, the inventor wanting to
retain a proprietary interest in the article would have to avail
himself of the protection afforded by the law of trade secrets.
A slight diversion is necessary to discuss trade secrets in light
of the overall purpose of this Comment. As the name implies, a
trade secret is a secret hidden from the public. If a company
wishes to maintain a trade secret, it must follow several guide-
lines: non-disclosure agreements must be made with employees;
no public disclosure of the information can be made by the com-
pany; and when dealing with other companies, the information
must be kept confidential between the companies. 60 The concept
of a trade secret would appear to directly contravene the policy of
the patent statutes-public disclosure. In a large company the
necessary controls are difficult to maintain, leading to the loss of
the trade secret. For companies which produce useful articles,
57. S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 113(a) (1967).
58. Id. § 113(a) (2).
59. Anything in the public domain which is not patented or copy-
righted may be freely copied. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S.
225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
60. See generally A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS (1962);
Correa, Protection of Trade Secrets, 18 Bus. LAW. 531 (1963); Comment,




keeping these articles as trade secrets is particularly difficult if
the company is planning to sell them publicly, since the secret is
lost if it is disclosed upon examination of the article placed into
commerce.61 Therefore, in the absence of patent protection, a pro-
ducer of most useful articles has no protection. The patent laws
would appear to be somewhat of a salvation, but they are not for
some very practical reasons.
As has been noted, from the time that a patent application is
filed to the time that it issues is approximately three years. Along
with this time lag is the minimum $165 fee for filing and issuance
of each patent. Often a company engaged in research and devel-
opment will submit proposals for new patentable useful articles to
customers who might be interested. Because of the uncertainty
that these proposals will be used by the customer and the high
filing costs, the supplier company frequently will not file a patent
application. To protect what the supplier company believes to be a
proprietary interest in the proposals and to avoid a public disclosure,
the company must rely upon the law of trade secrets to prevent
its proposal from being lost to the public domain. This in turn will
require the establishment of a confidential relationship between
the companies. Companies which maintain a dominant market
position, however, are using their economic power to contract
away any confidential relationships which their suppliers attempt
to establish.2 By negating the confidential relationship, the cus-
61. See Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181 (D. Md.
1962).
62. The following is a paraphrase of a letter which was sent from a
customer to a supplier. The letter is to be copied by the supplier under




Because we (the supplier) are being allowed the opportunity
to work with your engineers and to become familiar with your
needs regarding (project or proposal) all of which is to our advan-
tage, we agree and grant to you a free license which is both irre-
vocable and nonexclusive to make, use, sell or have made in this
and all countries articles of manufacture, compositions of matter,
machines and processes containing any patentable concepts con-
ceived or obtained by us (the supplier) stemming from improve-
ments upon concepts or invention you have disclosed to us in re-
lation to the above named proposal. We recognize that the word"you" means present and future subsidiaries, and companies con-
trolled by or associated with your central operation.
We further agree that we give you no license to patents or
patent application filed in the United States Patent Office or is-
sued by that office before the date of this agreement. We agree
that no license is granted for patentable concepts conceived or ob-
tained six (6) months after the termination of the work relating
to the above named project or proposal.
We agree to inform you immediately of any patentable con-
cepts that we decide to file on which relate to the license defined





tomer can reverse engineer the proposal or submit it for competi-
tive bids to competitors of the supplier company. The competi-
tors can supply the article at less cost than the supplier company
because they do not have research and development costs to con-
sider in their bids.
Even when the supplying company has filed a patent applica-
tion, all its problems are not solved. The patent statutes offer no
protection until the patent issues. If the prospective patentee de-
cides to produce the useful article and place it into the public
domain before a patent issues, any third party may make, use, or
sell the useful article until the patent issues. The prospective
patentee may affix a "patent pending" notice to the useful article,
but this offers no protection and simply warns third parties that a
patent may be forthcoming. Consequently, when the useful article
is a type that sells for only a limited time, either because it is
supplanted by an improvement or because the public buys it for
only a short period, third parties may jump in and reap the benefit
of the patentee's invention-including the research and develop-
ment time.68 When the useful article appears from the outset to
have long term usefulness, however, potential infringers may be
deterred from tooling up to produce it since they may lose their
initial outlay after the issued patent causes their inability to le-
gally produce the article.
Finally, there are those useful articles which do not disclose
upon inspection how they are made. They essentially remain trade
secrets until the patent issues and the benefit of public disclosure
is delayed.
The proposed McClellan Bill64 on patent revision attempts to
overcome some of these shortcomings. To allow immediate pub-
lic disclosure without the expenditure of large sums for application
and to diminish the need for confidential relationships and trade
secrets, the bill proposes a system of preliminary applications.6 5
63. The President's Commission on the Patent System recognized
this to be a very real problem. The Commission was suggesting publica-
tion of patent applications before they were issued as full-fledged patents.
This would mean that the public would be aware of the invention before
protection was granted. The Commission was attempting to avert this
possibility, because it recognized the following problem:
With a requirement of pre-issuance publication of an applica-
tion . . . anyone could copy the invention and make, use or sell it
until a patent is issued, possibly even exhausting its commercial
value.
Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System, To Promote
the Progress of . . . Useful Arts 32 (1966) (emphasis added).
64. S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
65. S. 1043, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 111(a), (c) (1967).
§ 111. Application for patent
(a) An application for patent may be filed by either the in-
ventor or the owner of the invention sought to be patented. The
application shall be made in writing to the Commissioner, shall be
signed by the applicant and include the name of each person be-
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These applications would simply contain a description of the inven-
tion with minimal formal requirements and cost. They would es-
tablish a priority date for invention and permit a supplier com-
pany to disclose information to customers with the knowledge that
all the information would be in the preliminary application. This
procedure would partially prevent the need for trade secrets and
allow the supplier company to buttress its proprietary position at
little cost.66 Several preliminary applications may be drawn to-
gether to form a completed application which must fulfill certain
formal requirements. 7 If the supplier company found that its
proposal to the customer was unacceptable, it could abandon its
preliminary applications without filing a completed application.
To obtain immediate public disclosure, the McClellan Bill pro-
poses that the completed application be publicly disclosed within
eighteen months of its effective filing date.68 A patentee may re-
quest that the completed application be disclosed earlier,6 9 but in
any event, at the time of allowance the completed application
must be published, even if that time is less than eighteen months.
70
This publication would in part overcome the problem of lack of
immediate public knowledge for those articles which do not dis-
close their inventiveness upon examination.
Since the application is to be published before the patent is-
sues, the McClellan Bill suggests a new basis for infringement.
The patentee may sue for damages prior to issuance if the follow-
ing conditions are met: (1) the application is published; (2) the
Patent Office allows the claim which appeared in the publication;
and (3) notice is given to the alleged infringer telling him how his
acts are considered to infringe the claim. In exchange for this
right to sue during the interim period, the patentee would grant a
nonexclusive license with a reasonable royalty for articles of
manufacture made prior to issuance and extending beyond issu-
ance.71 This provision would give slightly more protection for the
lieved to have made an inventive contribution, and shall be ac-
companied by the prescribed fee.
(c) A preliminary application containing the written descrip-
tion of an invention and otherwise complying with paragraph (a)
of this section may be filed.
66. This is substantially the position of the Commission:
Information contained in these applications could be disclosed
to the public without risk, through publication or market testing,
for example, as long as a complete application was filed within
twelve months of the earliest preliminary or foreign application
relied on.
Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System, To Promote
the Progress of . . . Useful Arts 9 (1966).
67. S. 1043, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 111(a), (b) (1967).
68. Id. § 123(a).
69. Id. § 123(b).
70. Id. § 151.
71. Id. § 273.
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patentee by moving up the date an infringement suit is possible
from issuance to allowance.
It is submitted that although the efforts of the McClellan Bill
are commendable, at least in this area, they still do not substan-
tially alleviate the previously enumerated problems. What is
needed is a means to provide immediate protection for inventions.
Any delay which allows those who have not participated in the
invention process to benefit from it without paying for that bene-
fit cannot be tolerated. Even the McClellan Bill provides no rem-
edy for acts of infringement occurring between filing and allow-
ance. Can a procedure which will allow immediate, low-cost pro-
tection be implemented without substantially detracting from the
basic concepts of invention: novelty, usefulness and unobviousness?
The day may come when computers can be sufficiently pro-
grammed to provide immediate protection by doing an instantane-
ous prior art search, but that is not so today. The following stat-
ute is suggested as an amendment to section 113 of the proposed
Copyright Law Revision. The amendment is suggested because
the McClellan Bill apparently will not be passed by Congress and
in any event because the McClellan Bill does not provide the
needed protection. The proposed amendment is made part of the
Copyright Law Revision because the copyright provides the kind
of immediate protection needed in this area.
A PnoPosED AENDMENT TO SECTION 113
§ 113 Protection of the utilitarian and functional aspects of useful
articles
(a) Useful articles shall include articles of manufacture.
(b) This section shall protect useful articles to the same
extent that the Patent Act, Title 35, does with the
enumerated exceptions.
(c) The protection afforded by this section shall begin
upon publication of the three dimensional embodi-
ment of the useful article with the proper copyright
notice as defined in subsection (c) (3), and shall last
for three (3) years from the date of publication or
until a patent issues, whichever event first occurs.
(1) Any public sale, use, or knowledge of the inven-
tion prior to publication with the proper copy-
right notice shall bar the use of this section.
(2) Prior to the three dimensional publication the
inventor or his assigns must file a detailed
drawing of the useful article along with a de-
scription of the inventive aspects of the useful
article. The description shall indicate the in-
ventive aspects of the invention by reference
to the drawing.
(A) The drawing and the description shall be
filed with the Copyright Office at which
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time the drawing and an abstract of the de-
scription shall be published by the Copy-
right Office.
(B) Upon publication by the Copyright Office
the inventor or his assigns may publish the
useful article. Protection begins upon the
three dimensional publication.
(C) Failure to comply with the above provisions
shall invalidate any protection.
(3) The useful article shall have on it in a conspicu-
ous place at the time of publication the follow-
ing notice: date, name of copyright holder.
(d) The criteria for infringement of this copyright shall
be the same as that found in the Patent Act, Title
35, except that the defense of independent dis-
covery shall be available to the person charged with
infringement.
(1) All defenses available to an alleged patent in-
fringer shall be available to an alleged in-
fringer of a useful article copyright.
(2) There shall be no presumption that the useful
article copyright is valid in an infringement
action.
(e) In the event that useful article copyright infringe-
ment is found, the only available remedy shall be
a reasonable royalty imposed upon the infringing
party for all acts of infringement during the term of
the useful article copyright.
(f) Any person during the term of the useful article
copyright may submit prior art to the Copyright
Office to show that the copyright is invalid be-
cause it is not novel, useful, or unobvious within
the meaning of the Patent Act, Title 35. Upon de-
termination by the Copyright office that such in-
formation does invalidate the useful article copy-
right, notice of invalidation shall be published.
(g) Any conflict with Title 35 and this section shall be
resolved in favor of Title 35.
Recognizing that there is very little new in the world, a first
reaction to this proposal might be that it is simply a restatement of
the foreign systems which do not require extensive examination
in their patent offices and which allow any controversies to be re-
solved in the courts. 2 Such a statement is partially true, but
the differences are significant. First, the period of protection is
abbreviated to three years or until a patent issues on the useful
article. This section thus embraces the period during which a
72. For a discussion of foreign patent laws see H. SCHEE, INTERNA-
TIONAL PATENT, DESIGN AND TRADEMARK LAw (1962); LANGNER, PARRY, CARD
& LANGNER, FOREIGN PATENTS (4th ed. 1951); WHITE & RAVENSCROFT, PATENTS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (2d ed. 1967).
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patent is being examined. The prospective patentee could not un-
duly overextend this copyright protection with patent protection on
the same useful article since the public disclosure required by this
section would invoke the statutory bar of section 102 of Title 3573
and give the prospective patentee one year to file for a patent.
Although the prospective patentee could receive a maximum of 20
years protection by using this section plus the 17 year protection
under Title 35, this term does not seem unwarranted since the
McClellan Bill and the President's Advisory Commission on the
Patent System both recommended a 20 year term from the date
of filing.
7 4
A considerable amount of current copyright law is incorpo-
rated into this section. Public disclosure without the proper filing
procedures and notice bars use of this section just as publication
without the proper copyright notice invalidates any copyright.
75
The defense of independent discovery limits the scope of the amend-
ment's protection. The standard copyright is not infringed if the
alleged infringer can prove that he did not copy the work, 76 and it
is felt that inclusion of this defense will diminish lengthy litigation
since proof of independent discovery may not be as difficult as the
standard patent defenses. Furthermore, this defense comports with
the general attempt to correlate this section with the other provi-
sions of the current Copyright Act and the proposed act. The pro-
vision that no presumption of validity shall be accorded a useful
article copyright is necessary because no formal examination of the
useful article is made to determine its inventiveness.
The ex parte opposition proceeding in the Copyright Office
affords the public the right to invalidate the useful article copy-
right without involved litigation. 77 The only problem is that the
task of examination, heretofore exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the Patent Office, is shifted to the Copyright Office. This divi-
73. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1952).
74. See S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 154 (1967); Report of the
President's Commission on the Patent System, To Promote the Progress of
... Useful Arts 33 (1966). The primary reason for this provision as noted
by the Commission is:
The term of a U.S. patent now extends for a period of seven-
teen years from the date of issuance. Measuring the patent term
from this point encourages deliberate delays in the prosecution of
applications, particularly those filed primarily for speculative rea-
sons and those having little immediate value. Another effect can
be the filing of continuing applications solely to delay the start
of a patent term.
Id.
75. See Metro Assoc. Serv. Inc. v. Webster City Graphic, Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 224 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Wrench v. Universal Fixtures Co., 104 F. Supp.
374 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
76. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
77. Opposition proceedings are not repugnant to our system. The
McClellan Bill provided for such opposition. See S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 136 (1967).
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sion of function may cause some unnecessary expense. Such ad-
ministrative problems are somewhat diminished, however, when it
is recognized that many articles receiving useful article copy-
rights will have been filed in a patent application. The Patent
Office could then easily submit an advisory opinion regarding the
opposition. When no patent application has been made, the Copy-
right Office and Patent Office may have to cooperate to resolve
the opposition proceeding.
If the useful article copyright is determined invalid, the copy-
right holder may come in to defend his position. This could be
done by appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The
scope of the invention would be defined by the detailed description
included with the filing. Although this system does shift the
burden of examination to the public, the equities are balanced by
granting immediate protection to the public. The public examina-
tion process could be somewhat facilitated if the Copyright Office
would publish the drawings and description by a classification cor-
responding to the Patent Office classification. For two persons fil-
ing concurrently, a first-to-file priority system should be adopted
to eliminate the need for interference proceedings.
7
One nagging concern about this proposal is that the country
will be deluged with unpatentable articles protected under the
proposed copyright amendment. But the current patent system is
already flooding the country with unpatentable articles, at least
as far as the courts are concerned. The number of patents held
valid and infringed in infringement suits is pitifully small .7 Of
course, strong patents are never involved in litigation because of
their strength. The same should be true of strong useful article
copyrights. Even assuming that an unprecedented number of un-
patentable articles are protected by this section, the opposition
proceeding can remove them at low cost since the need for an
infringement proceeding is substantially lessened. The copyright
can be declared invalid in an ex parte proceeding instead of an
adversary proceeding. If damages are significant, of course, an in-
fringement suit would be advisable.
Essentially what is proposed is the protection of an idea and
not the expression of that idea. This is patent language in a copy-
right setting. The proposal is limited to articles of manufacture
and leaves intact those cases holding that a method or plan for doing
something is not protected by copyright. It is simply an effort to
protect useful articles at an earlier date than they are now pro-
tected, recognizing that the reason for the delay is the administra-
78. See Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System,
To Promote the Progress of . . . Useful Arts 5 (1966).
79. For an analysis of patent infringement cases noting the disparity
in the circuits see STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPY-
RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN
ANALYSIS OF PATENT LITIGATION STATISTICS (Comm. Print 1961).
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tive process. With built-in safeguards such as the limited protec-
tion period and the opposition proceeding, the courts should not be
flooded with useful article infringement suits. For a brief period a
party may hold a legal upper hand with an unpatentable article,
but the benefits for those who have spent engineering and research
time and money to develop new articles seem to fulfill the policy
of protecting an inventor's proprietary information for a limited
time.
CONCLUSION
Current statutory copyright and patent protection of useful
articles is generally unsatisfactory. The current copyright law does
not protect functional useful articles. The patent statutes do pro-
tect such articles, but delay in the patent office and expensive
filing and issuance fees prohibit their total effectiveness. The
proposed Copyright Law Revision does not appreciably improve
this situation. The amendment herein proposed to section 113 of
the proposed Copyright Law Revision would extend a hybrid pat-
ent-copyright protection to useful articles for a limited period so
that the inventor's rights are fully protected.
GARY R. MYERS
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